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September I I and U.S Relations with Asia: Change and Continuity 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, most vividly 
demonstrated by the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, symbols 
of American economic and military power, have profoundly changed·both the way 
Americans view themselves and their country's relationships with other nations. 
John Lewis Gaddis, an eminent historian at Yale, claims that the post-Cold War 
era, which began with the collapse of one structure, the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989, ended with the collapse of another, the World Trade Center's twin towers on 
September 11, 200 t .1 
Only time will tell whether the collapse of the World Trade Center towers will 
eventually prove to be as consequential as the fall of the Berlin Wall twelve years 
earlier. But one thing is certain: As Americans were relishing unprecedented national 
security, ten years after the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of Soviet nuclear 
threat, the horrific tragedies of September 11 and the painful aftermath of adjusting to 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, ''And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era for the New One," in Strobe Talbott 
and Nayan Chanda, eds., The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11 (Basic 
Books and Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2001 ), p. 3. 
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what a new book describes as "the age of terror,"2 struck home the vulnerabilities of 
their ~omeland security. 
Gaddis argues that the clearest conclusion to emerge from the events of 
September 11 is that "the geopolitical position and the military power of the U.S. are 
no longer sufficient to ensure its security."3 He points out that the very term "national 
security," invented during WWII and used so frequently during the Cold War, always 
implied that both threats and vulnerabilities lay outside the country. However, in the 
aftermath of September 11, Americans have not only adopted the concept of 
"homeland security" -- it has become synonymous with national security.4 
The Terror War: Globalization Gone Awry? 
President Bush called September 11 "the first war of the twenty-first century." 
However, scholars call it the first war in the age of globalization.5 Among the targets 
of the attacks was globalization itself. After all, as Strobe Talbott, former Deputy 
Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration, states, globalization is about 
integration and inclusion but the terrorists' aim was partition and expulsion. They 
sought to reverse the benevolent dynamic of globalization and turn core American 
strengths -- openness and mobility -- into vulnerabilities.6 
Barely a few years ago, the mainstream discourse on globalization focused on its 
benign aspects, particularly the seemingly unbounded opportunities globalization 
entailed, especially for Americans. Thomas L. Friedman of the New York Times 
hailed that globalization had contributed to the emergence of a global market place 
and the rise of a "homogeneous" global culture that is essentially "the spread of 
2 Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, eds., The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 
11 (Basic Books and Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 200 I). 
J John Lewis Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era for the New One," in Talbott and 
Chanda, The Age of Terror, p. 6. 
4 Gaddi, pp. 8-9. 
s Kurt M. Campbell, "Globalization's First War?" 711e Washington Quarterly 25( I )(Winter 2002): 7-14. 
6 Talbott and Chanda, The Age of Terror. pp. xii-xiii. 
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Americanization on a global scale."7 To Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War 
irrefutably vindicated the triumph of free-market capitalism over all other ideological 
alternatives; hence, "the end of history."8 Friedman confidently proclaimed that the 
"globalization system" had replaced the Cold War system; hence, "the world is ten 
years old."9 
If anything, the attacks of September I I painfully show that the very instruments 
of the new world order -- airplanes, liberal policies on immigration and money 
transfers, and multiculturalism -- can be turned horribly against it. 10 Paul Kennedy, 
another eminent historian at Yale, puts it succinctly: "Here was a weakness in our 
own defenses created by one of our social strengths, namely, the permeability of 
American borders and the mobility and openness of America itself." 11 
Unfortunately, the U.S. is, and will remain the leading target of terrorists and its 
vulnerabilities are not limited to home. Using government statistics, Paul R. Pillar, 
one of the foremost authorities on the subject of terrorism and a former deputy chief 
of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) counterterrorism center, points out that 
one-third of international terrorist incidents recorded during the past two decades 
involved attacks on U.S. interests (either American property or American citizens).12 
The proportion has been rising, from 31 percent in the 1980s to 37 percent in the 
I 990s. 13 Pillar summarizes three main factors behind the terrorists' often targeting 
U.S. interests. 14 
7 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), p. 
8. 
8 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest. 16 (summer 1989). pp. 3-16. 
9 Friedman, The Lexus, pp. 7 and xiii. 
10 Gaddis, "And Now This," p. 17. 
11 Paul Kennedy, "Maintaining American Power: From Injury to Recovery," in Talbott and Chanda, 
The Age of Terror, p. 64. 
12 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 2001 ), p. 57. 
13 The kidnap and brutal killing of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter in Pakistan, is only the 
most recent incident that supports Pillar's "the superpower as target" thesis. 
14 These three points are summarized from Pillar, Terrorism, pp. 57-66. 
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The Superpower as Target 
The first reason reflects not only the way in which the U.S. is stronger than 
anyone else, but one in which it is not: terrorism itself. U.S. strengths are revealed in 
so many aspects: With the largest economy in the world (about $10 trillion), the U.S. 
accounts for one-third of all the defense expenditures of all 190 states. 15 Forty percent 
of all the internet traffic occurs in the U.S .. and over 70% of all recent Nobel laureates 
work in American universities and laboratories. 16 However, America's defenses are 
not impregnable, as each successful terrorist operation against the U.S. (the Oklahoma 
City bombing, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa, the World Trade Center 
attack, and so on) demonstrates. Offensively, the U.S. does not use terrorism at all. 
Since terrorism is one of those few areas in which the U.S. does not have an 
advantage, it is a promising tool for those who have strong grievances against the U.S. 
Terrorism, therefore, offers the allure of "asymmetric advantage" and becomes the 
one weapon with which the weak have a chance to be effective. 
The second main reason the U.S. is a prime target of terrorism is the sheer 
number and accessibility of U.S. interests that can be targeted. The ironies of 
globalization include the vulnerability that starts at home, a large and open society. 
The U.S. has, with Canada, the world's longest undefended border, and a border with 
Mexico that is another 2,000 miles long. The U.S. also receives a disproportionate 
share of international travelers, in part a reflection of the appeal of its economic and 
cultural systems. For instance, in fiscal year 2000 there were 533 million admissions 
to the U.S., and 66 percent of the total admissions were aliens. 17 
The U.S. also exports more people than any other country. The official U.S. 
presence overseas includes diplomatic representation in 160 countries, dozens of 
consulates, delegations to international organizations, and other missions, for a total 
of 290 diplomatic posts overseas as of late 2000. 18 More than thirty U.S. government 
1s,A whopping Department of Defense budget of $312 billion is authorized for FY 2002. Department 
of Defense, Defense Almanac (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/ [2 March 2002)). 
16 Kennedy, "Maintaining American Power," p. 59. 
11 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Monthly Statistical Report, September 2000 FY Year End 
Report (www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrscpOO/INSP.HTM [2 March 2002]). 
18 State Department data, quoted in Pillar, Terrorism, p. 59. 
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agencies operate overseas, employing more than 14,000 Americans and about 30,000 
foreign nationals. 19 In addition, as of 30 September 2000, out of the 1.38 million U.S. 
military personnel on active duty, about 258,000 were serving outside the U.S. and its 
territories.20 . Added to this official presence is the enormous overseas commercial 
presence of American companies and individual Americans traveling for business or 
pleasure. In a way, there seem to be too many American targets, and a terrorist needs 
only one good target. 
Thirdly, the role of the U.S. as leader of the West entails a further reason for 
special resentment against it. The Islamic militants in many parts of the world wail 
against America's cultural contamination and other forms of imperialism. 21 U.S. 
policies have been equally unacceptable to them. 
In sum, globalization has undoubtedly brought about positive benefits; yet, as the 
September 11 attacks demonstrate, it also changes the way war is fought. The 
problem -- the instruments of globalization -- may also hold key to the solution. The 
Bush Administration's policies toward other nations after September 11 reflect this 
paradoxical approach. Nowhere is this approach more evident than in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
"Everything Has Changed" 
In his address to the joint house of Congress on September 20, just days after the 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, President Bush made a point of 
internationalizing the nation's sense of outrage and resolve: 
This is not. .. just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just 
America's freedom. This is the world's fight, this is civilization's fight, 
this is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance 
19 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, America's Overseas Presence in the 2t' Centwy (Government 
Printing Office, 1999), p. 12. 
20 Department of Defense, Defense Almanac 
(http://www.defensclink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanae/people/serve.html [2 March 2002]). 
21 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivili;ations and the Remaking of World Order (Touchstone 
Books, 1998). 
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and freedom. 22 
In portraying the anti-terror war as a global campaign against evil, the President 
also sought to exert international pressure on those states or entities that wavered or 
refused support. On the night of the attacks, Bush declared in his televised address to 
the nation: "The U.S. will make no distinction between those who committed these 
acts and those who harbor them." Signaling a shift in the Pentagon's policy of using 
precision bombing as its weapon of choice, Bush said that "the U.S. will be far more 
open to sending in ground forces to capture or kill terrorists or to punish regimes that 
aid or abet them." 23 That declaration, of course, defined the subsequent military 
operations in Afghanistan to rout the Taliban regime from power and destroy the al-
Qaeda terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden. 
"Everything has changed" was, as some observers point out, the commonplace in 
Washington and elsewhere in the U.S. after the September 11 attacks.24 The partisan 
bickering in Congress came to an abrupt halt in a show of national unity. The Bush 
Administration also invested considerable diplomatic skills in fostering a global 
coalition against terrorism -- in an apparent reversal of a foreign-policy style that was 
being criticized both at home and abroad as unilateralist.25 
This strategy proved successful. America's allies saw the rare occasion of an 
attack on their protector (and one against innocent civilians at that) as an unusual 
opportunity to show their solidarity and loyalty. NA TO responded immediately by 
22 
"A Nation Challenged; President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress," 
The New York Times, 21 September 2001, p. B4, from Lexis-Nexis. 
23 Lionel Barber, "America's War: This Week's Attack on the US Was Launched From Within, and 
George W. Bush's Fight Against Terrorism Will be Prosecuted at Home As Well As Abroad," The 
Financial Times, 14 September 2001, p. 14, from Lexis-Nexis. 
24 Douglas Paa!, "President Bush's Visit to APEC in China: A Changed Agenda After September 11," 
October 200 I (http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/update bushapec.html [13 November 200 I]), 
p. 2; and Nicholas Platt, "September 11: The Impact on U.S. Relations with Asia," speech given to 
the World Affairs Council of Greater Richmond, 15 January 2002. 
2
s Many countries had criticized the withdrawal of the U.S. under the Bush Administration from the 
Kyoto Protocol on global climate change and the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the 
administration's determined effort to develop missile defense systems. 
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invoking, for the first time in its 52-year history, Article 5 of its founding treaty, 
declaring the attack on America to be an attack on the alliance as a whole, enabling 
America to call on its allies for military support.26 Australia also invoked the ANZUS 
mutual defense treaty for the first time, making it possible for its navy to support the 
U.S. fleet and even deploy troops.27 
The most remarkable performance was by Japan. Restricted by Article 9 of its 
Constitution (the so-called peace constitution), Japan had for years politely resisted 
the American call for the officially pacifist nation to assume a greater security role. 
Tokyo's decision to only provide financial support during the Gulf War in 1991 was 
widely criticized. Resolved to change its image of doing too little, too late, in an 
international crisis, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced seven steps Japan 
was willing to take to support the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism: 
• dispatching a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force squadron, including an 
amphibious airlift support ship, to the Indian Ocean; 
• agreeing to lift supplies to Pakistan in Japanese Air-Defense Force cargo 
planes; 
• p~oviding Ground Self-Defense Forces to guard American bases in Japan; 
• sending medical teams to the region 
• providing AW ACS aircraft to supplement U.S. air-control aircraft; 
• increasing assistance for an anticipated flood of refugees; 
• and downplaying Japan's reaction to Pakistan's nuclear-weapons testing and 
providing direct official development assistance to Islamabad.28 
These measures were codified into the historic Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
Law on 29 October 2001. It will enable Japan's SDF to participate globally as a U.S. 
26 
"Allies in Search ofa Strategy," The Economist, 22 September 2001, p. 13. 
27 John J. Tkacik, Dana R. Dillon, Balbina Hwang, and Sara J. Fitzgerald, "Preparing for the APEC 
Summit: Mobilizing Asian Allies for War," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Executive 
Summary, No. 1487 (4 October 2001), p. 1. 
28 Paal, "President," p. 4. 
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military ally -- at least in the anti-terror war campaign.29 
The shift in priorities was evident in the Asia-Pacific region. Before the attacks, 
America's focus in the region was to revive the economic vitality of this once vibrant 
region recovering from the 1997-99 financial crisis and to deal with an assortment of 
security issues, such as China's growing stature, the problem of weapons proliferation, 
and, more fundamentally, the continued viability of America's predominance in the 
region. 
Non-allies, such as Pakistan and China, saw the U.S.-led effort to fight global 
terrorism as a magnificent opportunity to improve their relationships with the U.S., 
which had been deteriorating since the end of the Cold War. Other countries, such as 
India, concerned that their nemeses might be courted by the U.S. in the anti-terror war, 
also eagerly offered help to the U.S. so as not to be left out. All of a sudden, the 
world seemed united around the U.S. over the cause of anti-terrorism. Whether it was 
the appalling nature of the attacks that helped forge a new coalition against terrorism 
or the desire to appease the U.S. that caused unsavory countries to "rally around the 
flag" is impossible to tell. What is clear is that the great power consensus, withering 
after the end of the Cold War, was "back in place in expanded form: the U.S., the 
European Union, Russia, China, and Japan are all on the same side now - at least on 
the issue of terrorism."30 
Also changed are American policies and the public perceptions of various 
countries. Table I is a succinct summary of some quick rewards various countries 
received from the U.S. according to Arms Sales Monitor, a watch-dog group. 
(Table I about here) 
As can be seen from Table I, cooperation with the U.S. reaped huge benefits. 
Pakistan and India got the U.S. to lift the sanctions imposed after the two South Asian 
states had conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Several Central Asian republics of the 
Former Soviet Union with dubious human rights records now received military aid 
and training due to their strategic locations for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. 
29 Larry M. Wortzel, "Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan's New Law Commits More Than 
Words to U.S. Effort," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1500 (5 November 2001), p. I. 
30 Gaddis, "And Now This," pp. 18-19. 
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Another change occured in Americans' attitudes toward foreign countries, as 
demonstrated in Table 2. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 2, based on the Harris Poll, shows that Americans' attitudes toward foreign 
countries had become "kinder and gentler." Not only did more Americans see 
traditional allies, such as the U.K., Canada, and Australia as true allies, but Americans 
also gave such countries as Russia and China some credit for helping out. Conversely, 
although even fewer Americans badmouthed the U.K., Germany, and Taiwan, the 
drop in those that called Russia and China "unfriendly or enemy" was most 
spectacular. Apparently Americans were grateful to both "friends in need" and 
"friends of convenience." 
Such a reservoir of popular sentiment, buttressed by official rewards brandished 
as inducements, undoubtedly facilitated anti-terror cooperation. 
The first phase of the military campaign ended with the swift dislodging of the 
highly repressive and reactionary Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction 
of the Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization in that country -- all with a miniscule 
number of American casualties. Afghanistan was liberated, and the international 
community got involved in rebuilding this war-torn nation. However, bin Laden's 
whereabouts have been unknown, and some suspect that he is still in hiding near the 
Afghan-Pakistani border. 
Just as the 1991 Gulf War revolutionized modern warfare and established 
America's predominance in the "new world order" (George Bush senior's phrase), the 
2001 Afghan War inaugurated a new type of warfare, combining air strikes, ground 
troops, and covert operations, and reconfirmed America as the undisputed singular 
superpower in the new era (so will George W. Bush junior coin a phrase?). 
The Asia Nexus: Problem and Solution 
The importance of the Asia-Pacific region to America's foreign policy goals in 
general, and anti-terrorism in particular, cannot be overstated. The first obvious trend 
is that global wealth and military power are increasingly concentrated in the Asia-
Pacific region. Table 3 shows that by 1998 Asia's share of world GDP had already 
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been 48 percent larger than that of North America and 61 percent larger than that of 
EuroP,e. By 2015 Asia's share of world GDP will be projected to be 2.53 times that of 
North America's and 2.26 times that of Europe's. 31 
(Table 3 about here) 
Furthermore, with Europe at ease, all the major flashpoints where great power 
rivalries may intersect -- the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, 
and India-Pakistan over Kashmir -- are in the region.32 As two scholars on strategy 
argue, this is where the big powers of the 21 51 century reside and, hence, it is the 
region that commands an increasing portion of U.S. attention and energy across a 
wide set of issues. 33 Indeed, this is where over I 00,000 U.S. troops are forward 
deployed to cope with any contingency. 34 This is also where the U.S. has long 
maintained a hub-and-spoke alliance system for years serving as the bedrock for the 
region's peace and stability.35 
Beneath the surface calm extant in much of the region there are deep cleavages 
and long-time disputes that could undermine peace. The two most obvious examples: 
over the course of the next decade some strategists believe that there is a real danger 
that the U.S. could be drawn into war over the long-standing disputes between North 
and South Korea or between China and Taiwan. The anti-terrorism campaign has not 
changed any "strategic fundamentals" of these fissures. 
Furthermore, strategically East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East are linked, 
as the anti-terrorism campaign demonstrates. In fact, even before September I I, 
31 
For more statistics for each major Asian country, made available on interactive form online, see the 
website of Strategic Asia (www.strategicasia.nbr.org). 
32 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller, eds., East Asian Security (MIT Press, 1996), pp. 3-31 
33 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2001-02 (National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2001), p. 7. 
34 The latest Pentagon figures (September 2000) show that the total number of U.S. troops stationed in 
East Asia and Pacific is 101,447. Japan is home of the largest contingent, with 40, 159, followed by 
South Korea's 36,565, and 23,352 afloat. "Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional 
Area and by Country" (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/peolple/serve.html [2 
March 2002]). 
35 
Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific 
Security Arrangements,": The Washington Quarterly 24(1)(Summer200 l ): 7-17 
,-
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many analysts had warned that the Pacific Rim would become the next battleground 
of global terrorism and yet the region is the least prepared region (save Africa) to 
combat extremists. 36 The biggest fear is that well-trained militants could possess 
fissile material within two years.37 
A full discussion of the multitude of causes for this troubling development is 
beyond the scope of this paper. But a general picture can be given: Socioeconomic 
liberalization in East Asia has intensified the marginalization of some groups while 
breaking down control on these marginalized and potentially extremist sectors of 
society. 
Given Asia's increasingly porous borders and rapidly improving 
communications, transport, and information infrastructure, these extremists now are 
able to develop closer political and financial links with militants, arms suppliers, drug 
dealers, and other shadowy forces in South Asia and the Middle East. This mix of 
socioeconomic marginalization, loosening political controls, and vanishing borders 
has created a worrisome situation in Asia. 38 
Southeast Asia, home to the largest Muslim nation (Indonesia) and two other 
countries with groups threatening to establish fundamentalist Islamic theocracies 
(Philippines and Malaysia), is surely an important front in the anti-terrorism war, as 
the main objective shifts to hunting down Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. 
This region has a large number of established Muslim fundamentalist groups 
sympathetic to Osama bin Laden. Therefore, the region is both an ideal safe haven for 
him and a potential base of operations from which he could launch terrorist 
counteroffensives against the U.S.39 
No wonder the U.S. has quickly turned its attention to the region after the initial 
military victories in Afghanistan. Even though cooperation has been extended to the 
areas of criminal justice, money laundering, immigration control, the most important 
36 Joshua Kurlantzick, "Fear Moves East: Targets the Pacific Rim," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, 
no. l (winter 2001), pp. 19-29. 
37 Kurlantzick, "Fear Moves East," p. 28. 
38 Kurlantzick, "Fear Moves East," pp. 19-20. 
39 Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan, "Southeast Asia and the War Against Terrorism," The Heritage 
Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1496 (23 October 2001), p. 1. 
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area has been military cooperation. 
Since September 11, the U.S. has been rapidly expanding military ties in Asia. 
Most visibly 600 troops "advise" Filipino troops fighting Muslim extremists of the 
Abu Sayaaf, whose top lieutenants had ties with al-Qaeda.40 The U.S. also has talked 
with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia about increasing military 
cooperation to pursue members of al-Qaeda. The Philippines could be a test case 
because the problems in other countries (e.g., Indonesia) are more serious but the 
relation with the U. S. in these countries are also not as close. Congress passed a bill 
to establish counterterrorism training programs for SEA armies. 41 
The U.S. has maintained a military presence in Asia since World War II, 
anchored by the 40,000 troops in Japan and 37,000 in South Korea. However, starting 
in the Clinton Administration, the U.S. has begun using the military "as a vehicle for 
engaging with and managing relations with an increasing number of countries''. 
Countries with ties to the U.S. military in turn get valuable help such as military 
training or access to equipment.42 
Furthermore, the needs arising from the military campaign in Afghanistan and 
the desire of Russian President Vladmir Putin to improve relations with the U.S. 
combined to give the U.S. unprecedented access to bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf also allowed U.S. troops 
access to bases in Pakistan for humanitarian and logistic purposes. The Bush 
Administration says that the U.S. will remain engaged in Central Asia but is not 
seeking permanent bases there.43 And it is preparing to conduct a realistic engagement 
policy with the five Central Asian republics that emphasizes improvements in human 
rights and the expansion of democratic processes, rather than a strictly base-for-aid 
40 In a reversal of the "people power" -- democratization that forced the U.S. to close its bases in the 
Philippines in 1991, a recent rally in Zambonga called on U.S. troops to stay. Raymond Bonner, 
""Yankee Don't Go' Is the Message in Philippines Antiterror Rally," The New York Times, 25 
February 2002, p. Al3, from Lexis-Nexis. 
41 Sally Buzbee, "Counterterrorism Moves to Southeast Asia," Associated Press, in The Washington 
Times, 18 February 2002. 
42 Buzbee, "Counterterrorism." 
43 David Sands, "U.S. Bases in Asia Said Vital, Transient," The Washington Times, 12 February 2002. 
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relationship.44 
America's Gains, China's Worries 
All these initiatives have served to improve America's diplomatic and strategic 
positions in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. has made military inroads into Central 
Asia for the first time, and American troops are making a return to Southeast Asia, a 
region that they vacated after the Vietnam War in the 1970s. 
The geopolitical realignment and U.S. gains may be deeply unsettling to China. 
Beijing is concerned that U.S. military presence in South Asia may exceed the 
proverbial "short duration" and become a permanent one on a backyard that is 
strategically crucial to China. The area where the strategic landscape could transform 
borders China's largest province, Xinjiang, which makes up one-sixth of China's land 
mass, with restless Muslim populations, and potential oil reserves. Moreover, Beijing 
feels that the race by several Central Asian republics to court favor with the U.S. may 
have also done irreparable harm to the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
which China painstakingly put together in 2000 mainly aimed at cutting off the 
Islamic militants in Xinjiang. 
On the southwestern front, the U.S. has Pakistan's complete cooperation. China 
has hitherto been Pakistan's staunchest ally and arms supplier. Although it is unlikely 
that the U.S. can successfully lure Pakistan away from China (Pakistan feels that a 
return to its role as a trusted intermediary between China and the U.S. can maximize 
its role and interests), America's simultaneous upgrading of relations with India, 
Pakistan's sworn enemy who often considers China as its major security threat, cannot 
be comforting. 
On the eastern front, China has reasons to be concerned. Japan's alliance with 
the U.S. has been upgraded. Bush is willing to talk tough vis-a-vis North Korea, 
China's ally, on behalf of South Korea. While cooperating with China, the U.S. has 
not made concessions over Taiwan. The U.S. has reinvigorated military and other 
relationships with the major members of the ASEAN. The U.S.-Australian alliance is 
stronger than ever. 
44 Editorial, "Securing Central Asia," The Washington Post, 18 February 2002, p. A22. 
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But most importantly, U.S.-Russian relations have improved greatly, so much so 
that Bush invited Putin to his Texas ranch in a demonstration of cordial ties. Russia 
has been helpful on the question of Central Asian bases. Its opposition to NA TO 
expansion and America's determination to build up it missile defense system has also 
softened. Indeed, its reaction to Bush's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty was uncharacteristically mild. The improving Russian-
American relationship stands to offset the Sino-Russian relationship, which Beijing 
has assiduously cultivated for years as a counterweight against American 
"hegemonism." 
To be sure, China has not been without rewards. To start off, the anti-terrorism 
cooperation arrested the further deterioration of U.S.-China relations -- caused by, 
among other factors, Bush's campaign rhetoric calling China a "strategic competitor" 
(in contrast to Clinton's formula of"strategic partner"), the EP-3 incident, and Bush's 
remarks that he will do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself against 
Chinese attacks. Bush traveled to Shanghai in October 200 I, one month after the 
September I I attacks, to attend the APEC meeting. In February 2002, after his stays 
in Japan and South Korea, Bush went to visit Beijing, on the occasion of the 301h 
anniversary of Nixon's historic visit to China in I 972. All in all, even though the 
atmosphere improved, no substantive progress was made on issues dividing the two 
powers, such as nuclear proliferation, Taiwan, human rights, and religious persecution. 
China's attitude toward the U.S.-led anti-terrorism war is ambivalent. On the 
one hand, Beijing clearly cherishes the opportunity presented by this war to restore 
the strategic glue in the bilateral relationship. The common goal of countering the 
Soviet Union had been an important bond in the U.S.-Chinese relationship during the 
Cold War. The end of the Cold War and the dissipation of the Soviet threat eroded 
the strategic rationale behind the relationship. The American reaction to the 
Tiananmen crackdown further diminished the domestic political support for "business 
as usual." Many analysts therefore pin their hope on anti-terrorism cooperation's 
possibly forming a new glue that bonds the two countries together. 
However, many anti-American elements exist in China today, making total 
accommodation with the U.S. unlikely. China also does not feel as much the need for 
September 11 And U.S Relations With Asia: Change And Continuity 15 
revenge as the U.S. does since the attacks occurred on American soil. But most 
importantly China is afraid of being virtually encircled as a result of a series of 
reinvigorated relationships that the U.S. has fostered with China's neighbors. China is 
especially concerned about the long-term impact of the anti-terrorism war: it may 
consolidate America's preeminent position in the Asia-Pacific region at the expense 
of China's aspirations to play a larger role in regional and global affairs. 
China's ambivalent attitude toward the U.S.-led effort also belies the fact that 
China is not a crucial partner of the U.S. in the anti-terrorism war. If nations could be 
ranked in a series of concentric circles in terms of their importance to the U.S. in the 
war effort and the degree of congruence of their interests with America's, China is not 
located at the core, which includes America's staunchest traditional allies such as 
NA TO and Japan; nor does it belong in the second ring, which now ·includes such 
nations as Pakistan whose cooperation the U.S. eagerly seeks. China is probably 
somewhere in the third or fourth circle -- a sphere for those countries whose 
cooperation is desirable but not essential from the U.S. standpoint. The U.S.-Chinese 
relationship since September 11, to use David M. Lampton 's words, is one of "small 
mercies. "45 
Why Wide Support of the U.S.? 
Undoubtedly certain nations decided to support the U.S. out of outrage and 
sympathy. Yet a more plausible understanding should focus on national interests in 
explaining the wide support enjoyed by the U.S. A brief overview is in order.46 
South Asia 
The balance of power in South Asia compels Pakistan to risk further domestic 
instability in its effort to cooperate with the U.S. The war on terrorism presents 
Pakistan with an opportunity to rekindle good relations with the U.S. Pakistan is 
important, because should it disintegrate or be taken over by Islamic extremists, an 
45 David M. Lampton, "Small Mercies: China and America After 9/11," The National Interest (winter 
2001), pp. 106-113. 
46 This part is based on Ellings and Friedberg, Strategic Asia, pp. 6-16. 
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extraordinary new level of instability would rock the region . 
. America's new cooperation with Pakistan is unlikely to jeopardize closer US 
relations with India. If anything, the crisis seems to accelerate the movement toward 
a closer US-Indian relationship. 
Russia 
The attacks on the US creates a common bond between Russia and the U.S., one 
that is serves to soften friction arising from NA TO expansion, NMD, etc. Russia 
wants to frame the Chechen problem as one of terrorism but Chechnya is a broader 
national movement. However, a political solution is imaginable. 
There has been a convergence of interests among Russia, India, and even Iran 
with respect to the Taliban (Russia was the main supporter of the Northern Alliance). 
But Russia will prevent its cooperation with the U.S. against the Taliban from eroding 
Russian predominance in Central Asia. 
China 
The government under Jiang Zemin seems sincerely willing to help the U.S.-led 
effort against terrorism, but it is not unlikely this support will endure very long. 
China has its own reasons to cooperate -- (I) militant Islamic groups in Xinjiang with 
ties to al-Qaeda, (2) to prevent further erosion of ties with the U.S., (3) China wants to 
be a respected great power. 
Beijing can provide assistance: It has experience in countering Islamic 
extremism (useful intelligence, influence over Pakistan, in turn Afghanistan; Central 
Asia). Such cooperation is not new (occurring during the Cold War Soviet war in 
Afghanistan). 
Potential roadblocks to long-term PRC cooperation include: (I) a longer and 
broader anti-terror campaign (setting a precedent), (2) China's nervousness about 
military cooperation with India, a revitalized US-Japan alliance, and permanent bases 
on China's periphery; (3) possibly the PRC's cooperation with the U. S. not leading to 
any quid pro quo over Taiwan. 
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Japan 
The Japanese were unprepared to take a leading part in a multinational campaign 
against terroism. The norm has been to meet terrorist demands. Japan is resolved to 
avoid a repetition of the embarrassment in the Gulf War. Public opinion is divided. 
America's economic slowdown as a result of the crisis will worsen Japan's economic 
troubles. 
In the short run, Japan will scramble to avoid being isolated and embarrassed. In 
the medium term, the war on terrorism will prove to be a milestone in advancing 
politico-military realism. 
Korea 
The September 11 attacks have done little to alter the strategic fundamentals on 
the Korean Peninsula. Immediately, the attacks beg the question about Seoul's 
"sunshine" diplomacy with the North. Kim Dae Jung sought to enlist Pyongyang in 
the signing of a joint North-South declaration against terrorism. 
More fundamentally, September 11 forces a reexamination of the Bush 
Administration's nascent "military reform," -- doing away with "two war" military 
capabilities in favor of a new, smaller, more mobile international force. 
Southeast Asia 
Leaders and media responded with shock and sympathy. Bin Laden's network 
may have operatives in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front and Abu Sayaff). 
Ballistic Missiles 
A long-term, US-led campaign against global terrorism could lead to the US's 
diminishing significantly the amount of attention and resources it devotes to the threat 
of ballistic missile proliferation, as well as the development of a ballistic missile 
defense system.These shifts could encourage proliferators, prompting some in the 
Bush Administration to further push for missile defense. 
Possible instabilities in South and Central Asia arising from U.S.-led anti-terror 
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war could increase tensions among Pakistan, India, and China, and instability in 
. 
Pakistan could exacerbate the proliferation problem. 
What Has Not Changed or Has Remained? 
The next phase of the anti-terror campaign will encounter several thorny 
problems: some are old, some are new. 
The military and diplomatic strategies that helped undergird the successful war 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda began to show their strains, as the U.S. grappled 
with devising strategies to sustain the anti-terrorist campaign and revisiting those 
grave matters that had been swept under the rug for the sake of forging cooperation. 
The first issue that will test the administration is "what next?" and whether or not 
there is an "end game". After defeating the evil Talibans and al-Qaeda, President 
Bush sought to lead the global coalition to fight other evils. In his first State of Union 
address to Congress, Bush said that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq belonged to an "axis 
of evil."47 Although denying that the President's putting these three states on notice 
signaled imminent attacks against them, the administration's tough stance reflected its 
ultimate concern about a deadly combination that would be highly injurious to U.S. 
interests and those of its allies: rogue states developing weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery. There was considerable opposition from various corners. 
Some criticized Bush's remarks as a foreclosing on the opportunity for rapprochement 
with either North Korea or Iran -- both have sent signals in recent years that they seek 
to improve relations with the U.S. South Koreans were concerned that Bush's 
characterization of North Korea would undermine President Kim Dae Jung's 
"Sunshine Policy" of engaging rith their recalcitrant northern neighbor.48 
In addition, as attention shifted to hunting down entities with ties to al-Qaeda in 
those Southeast Asian countries with restive Muslim populations, the diplomatic task 
became trickier and the military task more complicated. 
47 David E. Sanger, "A Nation Challenged: The Rogue List; Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes on 
Notice," The New York Times, 31 January 2002, p. A 1, from Lexis-Nexis. 
48 Editorial, "Reviving Korean Diplomacy," The New York Times, 18 February 2002, p. A 14, from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
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The second test is the nettlesome issue of proliferation. Both China and Pakistan, 
two nations currently enlisted by the U.S. to help combat terrorism, have (cfose1 '.~·· 
military relationship with one or more members of Bush's "axis of evil." In fact, from 
the U.S. standpoint, no amount of good will extended to it by these nations in the war 
against global terrorism can compensate for the inordinate injury done to US interests 
caused by these nations' continued proliferation of weapons. President Bush's recent 
trip to China ended on the disappointing note over Beijing's continued shipments of 
missile components and technologies to North Korea, Iran and Pakistan,49 a dispute 
which50Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described as "remaining an irritation in the 
relationship" between the U.S. and China. 
A third challenge is the legitimate concern expressed by many in the human 
rights community that the anti-terror war may undermine the cause of human rights, 
because some governments may now define anybody who is opposed to the 
government as a "terrorist" and seek international support for the government's 
positions. Russia attempted to frame the Chechen problem as one of terrorism, but 
Chechnya's is actually a broader national movement. 51 
China argued that the Xinjiang Uighurs, who had struggled with China to restore 
their Republic of Eastern Turkistan, were linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, 
and sought to gain international sympathy on Beijing's positions on other 
49 David E. Sanger, "China Is Treated More Gently Than North Korea for Same Sin," The New York 
Times, 21 February 2002, p. A8. 
so Mike Allen, "Powell Says China's Sales of Arms Technology Still Hinder Relations,'' The 
Washington Post, 23 February 2002, p. A 13. 
51 According to Rajan Menon, the Chechens never accepted their incorporation into the Russian/Soviet 
empire and have repeatedly tried to break free -- sometimes violently. Central Asian states gained 
independence because they were union republics within the Soviet federal system that collapsed. 
But who decided that Uzbeks would be in a union of republics whereas Chechens would not? Josef 
Stalin. Thus the Chechen claim to independence is "illegitimate" only to the extent that Soviet 
constitutional precepts are accorded legitimacy and Chechen resistance to Russia ignored. Richard J. 
Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2001-02 (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001 ), 
pp.9-10. 
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"separatists" in Tibet and Taiwan52and Falun Gong followers. As Ross Terrill states, 
"Most Americans see the war against terrorism as a fight against broad forces opposed 
to freedom. Beijing sees the war as a defense of the unity and security of 
authoritarian China. There is a fine line between authoritarianism and imperial 
authority. "53 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell assured the American public and Taiwan that 
no deal over Taiwan had been cut for Chinese cooperation. 54 National Security 
Advisor Condoleeza Rice maintained, "We continue to draw a line in all of our 
discussions between legitimate dissent or legitimate movements for the rights of 
minorities and the fact that there may be international terrorists in various parts of the 
world."55 
More fundamentally, some are concerned that the US is cozying up to unlikely 
new bedfellows as it forms a coalition to battle terrorism. But its actions could 
backfire down the line and create new instability. 56 
To sum up, September 11 has profoundly changed America's relations with Asia, 
but not America's interests in the region -- securing peace, maintaining an open 
economy, and the advancement of freedom and the rule of law. The exigencies of the 
war call for an emphasis on congruence on interests above congruence on values. 
However, in the long-run cultivating congenial values goes a long way in eradicating 
some sources of terrorism in the distant future. This is a much better strategy than 
retaliation. 
52 John Pomfret, "China Also Wants U.S. Help Against 'Separatists,"' The Washington Post, 19 
September 2001, All; Joe McDonald, "Anti-Terror Campaign Gives U.S., China New Common 
Ground," The Associated Press, 17 October 2001, from Lexis-Nexis. 
53 Ross Terrill, "China, the Uncertain Ally," The New York Times, 19 February 2002, p. A 19, from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
54 Ellings and Friedberg, Strategic Asia, p. 12. 
55 David E. Sanger, "Bush's New Focus Requires a Shift in His China Policy," The New York Times, 18 
October 2001, p. B5, from Lexis-Nexis. 
56 Murray Hiebert, "A Flawed Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 October 2001, p. 30; Michael 
Vatikiotis, Ben Dolven, and David Murphy, "Terror Throws Us Together, For Now," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1November2001, p. 36. 
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Table I: A Quick Guide to Anti-Terror Rewards 
Pakistan 
• Nuclear-test and military coup related sanctions lifted 
• $73 million worth of military aid approved 
• $600 million in Economic Support Funds approved 
India 
• Nuclear-test related sanctions lifted 
Philippines 
• $92.3 million of additional weapons promised 
Tajikistan 
• Military aid and weapons sanctions dropped 
• Border control aid planned 
Azerbaijan 
• Arms sanctions lifted 
• Border control aid given 
Armenia 
• $4.3 million in military aid and training 
Uzbekistan 
• Equipment and training 
Turkey 
• Additional weapons and training pledged 
• Military debt forgiveness being negotiated 
Colombia 
• More aid planned to fight "narco-terrorists" 
Kenya 
• Weapons and combat training planned 
Source: Arms Sales Monitor, No. 47 (January 2002), p. 2. 
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Tables 2: How Has September 11 Changed the Way Americans View Other Countries 
Bigg~st increases since last year in those Biggest declines since last year Ill those 
saying "a close ally" (%) saying "enemy" or ··not friendly"(%) 
Country 2000 2001 Change Country 2000 2001 Change 
U.K. 63 80 +17 Russia 50 33 -17 
Mexico 28 40 +12 China 64 49 -15 
Russia 5 17 +12 Chile 29 17 -12 
Canada 63 73 +10 Germany 20 10 -10 
Germany 29 39 +10 Argentina 25 16 -9 
Italy 27 37 +IO Taiwan 25 18 -7 
China ... 11 +8 Brazil 23 16 -7 .) 
Israel 31 38 +7 U.K. 8 -7 
Australia 42 47 +5 Japan 29 24 -5 
Japan 23 26 +3 Australia 10 7 ... -.) 
Taiwan 19 22 +3 India 29 
India 8 
Notes: According to The Harris Poll, the 2001 poll was "conducted within the United States between 
17-22 October 2001 among a nationwide cross-section of 1,011 adults. Figures for age sex, 
race, education, number of adults and number of voice/phone lines in the household were 
weighted where necessary to align the sample with their actual proportions in the population. In 
theory, with a probability sample of this size, one can say with 95 percent certainty that the 
results have a statistical precision of plus or minus three percentage points within what they 
would be if the entire adult population had been polled with complete accuracy." 
The comparative polls of 2000 and 2001 consist of respondents' opinions about 
twenty-two countries. For comparison, the first eight countries in each column are 
ranked by the biggest increases or biggest declines from 2000 to 2001, respectively, 
followed by the remaining Asia-Pacific countries in the poll. 
Source: Compiled from The Harris Poll #54 (31 October 2001 ), "Events Since 
September 11 1h Have Changed the Way Many Americans View Other Countries," 
available online at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris poll/index.asp?PID=265. 
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Table 3: Percentage Shares of World GDP 
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998 2015 
----------·----------------··-···---------·------··------------·····-·-·-···---·-·-·--···-····· 
Asia 59 38 25 19 24 37 43 
Europe 27 38 38 30 29 23 19 
North America 2 10 22 31 25 25 17 
Russia 5 8 9 10 9 ,., 3 .) 
Sources: Figures for 1820-1998 are from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial 
Perspective (Paris: Development Center of the Organization for Economic Development and 
Development, 2001), Table B-18; projections for 2015 are from Angus Maddison. Chinese 
Economic Pe1formance in the Long Run (Paris: Development Center of the Organization for 
Economic Development and Development, 1998), p. 97. 
